security · proboi

Your data
under lock.

Every user runs in their own isolated secure container. No one else gets in — not a neighbor on the service, not an admin.

server in Moscow, Russian data law compliant not trained on your requests TLS on every hop
vault · #00427 locked
only you
how every pro user is protected

Four layers
from the door to the kernel

Every paid user gets their own slice of the server. Each layer is independent: even if one is compromised, the rest hold.

01

Your own box

Every paid user gets a dedicated Docker container: an isolated mini-system inside the server. Their own disk slice, their own processes, their own permissions. No shared space between guests.

System files are read-only. Another user's process physically cannot reach your vault.
02

Double isolation at the kernel level

On top of the container — two more layers. User namespace remapping: inside the container you're a regular user, but on the host you're "nobody" — no rights outside your own vault. If a kernel CVE drops tomorrow, a container escape gains nothing. Plus a syscall interception layer between guest processes and the host kernel.

An attacker would have to break through several independent layers at once. Data-center grade.
03

Network, two firewalls

Guest containers cannot see each other on the network. A request from your address to a neighbor's address simply doesn't arrive. Internal service interfaces are closed at two independent firewall levels (INPUT and DOCKER-USER chains).

Firewall rules are restored automatically on restart. They cannot be accidentally opened.
04

Hard resource limits

One user cannot bring down the service — accidentally or otherwise. Each container has a cap on memory, processes, and disk (vault 2 GB). Request frequency is bounded by a token bucket. If you exceed the limit, the bot asks you to clean up — it doesn't crash and doesn't affect your neighbors.

A separate "credit window" protects against an accidental runaway task burning money.
on top of the layers

A few more technical measures

Not part of the onion, but they work along the entire request path.

identity

Telegram userId verified before processing

A stranger's message is dropped before any processing — no reply, no log entry. The userId cannot be forged via a regular message — it's signed by the Bot API.

path + cmd

Path and command allowlist

Filesystem operations are validated against an explicit allowlist. Bash commands are also checked before execution.

TLS

Encryption in transit

TLS 1.2+ on all connections: Telegram → bot, bot → model providers, bot → YooKassa.

request path

What happens at each step

You Telegram Proboi AI model TLS userId check API · no training

Step 1 — TLS in transit

Your message travels from your device to Telegram's servers over TLS 1.2+. The same applies on every hop from the bot to its providers.

Step 2 — Authentication by userId

The bot checks the Telegram userId against an explicit allowlist. Messages from unknown accounts are dropped before any processing — no reply, no log entry.

Step 3 — Context isolation

A separate session and a separate container are created for each user. One user's history, files, and settings are physically inaccessible to another.

Step 4 — Sending to the model

The request is forwarded to one of the providers. All providers, under the terms of API access, do not use requests to train their models.

payments

Your card details go directly to the processor.

Payments are handled by YooKassa — a Russian payment service licensed by the Central Bank of Russia. PCI DSS certified, the same standard banks use. We only see the fact of payment, not your card details.

we never see
card number, CVV, cardholder name
we see
payment id, status, amount, date
refunds
back to the same card, same route
cancel
one message to the bot

Third-party services that process your data

A list of sub-processors that receive data when you use the service.

All providers, under the terms of API access, do not use requests to train their models.

Storage & deletion

deleted on command

/forget and /new

These commands delete the assistant's memory, your container, and your session. Vault data is removed immediately.

not auto-deleted

Payment history & audit logs

Payment history is retained for 5 years under Russian accounting law. Technical audit logs (without conversation content) — 30 day rolling window.

full removal

Account deletion request

To permanently leave the service, email abuse@proboi.site. We will delete your remaining data within 30 days.

Encryption

in transit

TLS 1.2+ everywhere

All connections — Telegram → bot, bot → providers, bot → YooKassa — are protected by TLS.

at rest

Hosting-provider disk encryption

Timeweb Cloud disk encryption is used. There is no additional application-level encryption — all protections are implemented at the OS and container level.

Incident response & security contact

breaches

Incident notification

In the event of a personal data breach we will notify Roskomnadzor within 24 hours and affected users within 72 hours in accordance with applicable law.

responsible disclosure

Report a vulnerability

Found a bug or vulnerability? Email abuse@proboi.site. We respond within 7 business days. The same address handles abuse and legal inquiries.

honest limits

What we don't promise.

These three points are stated deliberately — so you can make an informed decision.

e2e

No one offers end-to-end encryption

A language model needs plaintext. A channel where even the provider cannot see the content cannot exist by design. This is how all AI services work. It is an architectural property of all LLMs.

0-day

100% protection from unknown vulnerabilities does not exist

A layered architecture reduces the likelihood of an attack and limits its scope. But no one can promise protection against tomorrow's 0-days, including the largest clouds.

certifications

We don't have SOC 2 / ISO 27001

These certifications are needed for enterprise contracts. We invest in real technical measures, not audit paperwork. If a formal certificate is a hard requirement for your use case — that is a fair deal-breaker.

what depends on you

Architecture can't protect you from yourself.

No architecture protects against what the user voluntarily sends out. So:

rule → if you wouldn't send it to ChatGPT, don't send it to Proboi either
Public offer (RU) terms of service Privacy policy (RU) what we store and why Terms of use (RU) rules of the service

Have questions? Ask the bot directly.

If you need a formal document for a security team review, write to us — we'll send one.

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